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LIMITING THE CLOSELY REGULATED BUSINESS
EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT:
V-1 OIL CO. V. WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 902 F.2d 1482
(10TH Cir. 1990)
The fourth amendment protects against "unreasonable searches and
seizures" and declares that "no Warrant shall issue, but upon probable
cause."' Historically, the Supreme Court interpreted these two clauses
to mean that most warrantless searches are unreasonable.2 In recent
times, the Court has carved out a limited exception for administrative
searches pursuant to regulatory legislation.3 As public health and
safety concerns have increased, so have the number of government in-
spection schemes4 to ensure that businesses comply with certain mini-
1. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affniration, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). In Camara, the Court
held that "except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private prop-
erty without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid
search warrant." Id. at 528-29.
3. See infra notes 28-64 and accompanying text for discussion of the evolution of
the Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment in regard to warrantless administra-
tive searches.
The validity of a warrantless search presently depends upon whether the industry
involved is pervasively regulated and whether the authorizing statute limits the search
in time, manner, and scope to provide an adequate substitute for a warrant. See Cauley,
Constitutionality of Warrantless Environmental Inspections, 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
83, 84 (1990). See also infra notes 46-49, 54-63 and accompanying text for a discussion
of cases dealing with this issue.
4. See, e.g., Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(B)-(C) (1988) (allowing the
Secretary of the Treasury or his representative to enter the premises of licensed gun
dealers at reasonable times to examine their records and firearms); Occupational Safety
and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1988) (allowing the Secretary of Labor to inspect
work places "during regular working hours and at other reasonable times, and within
reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner"); Federal Mine Safety and Health Act,
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mum standards.' Correspondingly, businesspersons have pursued civil
rights claims alleging that warrantless administrative searches violate
their fourth amendment rights.6 In V-1 Oil Co. v. Wyoming, Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality,7 the Tenth Circuit held that a warrant-
less search of a gasoline station under the Wyoming Environmental
Quality Act 8 violated the fourth amendment by failing to provide
proper notice. 9
In V-1 Oil, Steven Gerber, a supervisor for the Wyoming Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality (DEQ), ° inspected without a war-
rant11 open storage tanks on the premises of the V-1 Oil Station 2
30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1988) (allowing the Secretary of Labor or one of his authorized
representatives to enter any coal mine to inspect the conditions or investigate compli-
ance with new health and safety standards).
5. In 1970 the federal government passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA). 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988). OSHA regulates all work areas within its juris-
diction and allows for inspections to ensure that employers comply with its regulations.
In 1977, Congress passed the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act (FMSHA). 30
U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1988). FMSHA requires all mines to meet mandatory safety and
health standards set by the Secretary of Labor and enforced by inspectors. More re-
cently, in 1980, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). CERCLA
regulates the release, storage, and removal of hazardous substances.
6. See, eg., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 693, 696 (1987) (junkyard owner
claimed law enforcement officers violated his fourth amendment rights when they exe-
cuted a warrantless inspection of his business premises pursuant to a New York statute
aimed at reducing auto theft); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 597 (1981) (Secretary
of Labor filed suit to enjoin mine operator from preventing FMSHA inspectors to make
warrantless searches); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 312-13 (1972) (pawn shop
owner claimed that a warrantless search under the Gun Control Act of his locked store-
room resulting in his arrest and conviction for illegally dealing firearms violated his
fourth amendment rights).
7. 902 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 295 (1990); cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 295 (1990).
8. Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-109(a)(v)-(vi) (1988).
9. 902 F.2d at 1487.
10. V-1 Oil Co. v. Wyoming, Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 696 F. Supp. 578, 579 (D.
Wyo. 1988). "As part of Mr. Gerber's duties, he investigates discharges of pollution,
such as petroleum products, into groundwater." Id.
11. Id. at 581-82. The officer could not obtain a search warrant before the inspec-
tion due to an Assistant Attorney General's inability to find an available judge. Id. at
579.
12. Id. Prior investigations had indicated that the V-I station was a source of gaso-
line pollution. Id. Gerber sought quick inspection because the covers were off the stor-
age tanks. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol39/iss1/10
V-1 OIL
pursuant to the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act.13 V-1 Oil fied a
civil rights suit" against the State of Wyoming, the Department of En-
vironmental Quality, and Gerber,15 alleging that the warrantless search
violated the fourth amendment.1 6 The district court granted defend-
ants' motion for summary judgment,17 holding that the Wyoming stat-
ute authorized the warrantless search of the gas station18 and that the
inspection was reasonable. 9 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed
13. Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-109(a)(vi) (1988) provides in pertinent part:
(a) In addition to any other powers and duties imposed by law, the director of
the department shall...:
(vi) Designate authorized officers, employees or representatives of the department
to enter and inspect any property, premise or place, except private residences, on or
at which an air, water or land pollution source is located or is being constructed or
installed, or any premises in which any records required to be maintained by a
surface coal mining permittee are located. Persons so designated may inspect and
copy any records during normal office hours, and inspect any monitoring equip-
ment or method of operation required to be maintained pursuant to this act at any
reasonable time upon presentation of appropriate credentials, and without delay,
for the purpose of investigating actual or potential sources of air, water or land
pollution and for determining compliance or noncompliance with this act, and any
rules, regulations, standards, permits or orders promulgated hereunder.
Id.
14. The plaintiff filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), which provides that
anyone who deprives another of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution" may be held liable in an action at law.
15. V-1 Oil Co. v. Wyoming, Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 696 F. Supp. 578, 580 (D.
Wyo. 1988).
16. Id.
17. Id. In V-l's brief opposing defendants' motion for summary judgment, V-1 ad-
mitted "[t]he defendant State of Wyoming's Motion for Summary Judgment should be
granted, pursuant to the State's immunity as provided by the 1 th Amendment to the
Constitution." Id. V-i's attorney later attempted to change his view on this matter
arguing that no case law supported this position. Id. The district court, however,
agreed with his prior statement and dismissed the State of Wyoming and the Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality from the suit because the State of Wyoming failed to
consent to the suit as required under the Constitution. Id. Although the state and the
Department of Environmental Quality remained named parties on appeal, the case pro-
ceeded solely against Mr. Gerber. Id.
18. Id. at 581. The court held that although the Wyoming statute does not contain
the words "warrantless search," numerous courts in other jurisdictions do not require
explicit reference to the term before warrantless searches may proceed. Id. The defend-
ant argued, and the court agreed that he conducted the search in conformity with the
statute because the defendant was qualified as one entitled to investigate the gas station
and the search took place at a "reasonable time upon presentation of appropriate cre-
dentials and without delay." Id.
19. Id. at 581-82. The district court used a three-part test in determining whether
1991]
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and remanded,2 ° but held that the warrantless search under the Wyo-
ming statute violated the fourth amendment because the statute did not
provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.21
The Supreme Court has held that the fourth amendment's22 reason-
ableness and warrant provisions were intended "to safeguard the pri-
vacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
governmental officials.",23 The Court has further held that the fourth
amendment's guarantee of freedom from illegal searches for the pur-
pose of obtaining incriminating evidence applies to individuals' homes
and to commercial property.24
More recently, the Court has addressed the problem of how to bal-
the defendant conducted a reasonable search. Id. at 581 (citing New York v. Burger,
482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987)). First, the court found that the potential danger to the
groundwater system posed by faulty gasoline storage tanks satisfied the requirement
that a" 'substantial' government interest" exists. Id. Second, the court found that war-
rantless searches under the Wyoming statute were "necessary to further [the] regulatory
scheme" emphasizing that Gerber attempted to obtain a warrant before making the
warrantless search. Id. at 581-82 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600
(1981)). Third, the court found that the statute provided an adequate substitute for a
warrant. Id. at 582. In reaching its conclusion, the court found that the state perva-
sively regulated the gasoline industry, effectively giving notice to persons engaged in the
business that the state might subject their premises to warrantless administrative
searches. Id. at 582.
20. The three judge panel affirmed the judgment in favor of Gerber on the ground of
qualified immunity, but remanded to determine the amount of attorney fees recoverable
to the plaintiff. V-1 Oil Co. v. Wyoming, Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 902 F.2d 1482, 1490
(10th Cir. 1990). Judge Ebel dissented from the opinion, but only on the issue of
Gerber's qualified immunity from the suit. Id. at 1490-93.
21. Id. at 1487. A unanimous court agreed that the statute failed to provide the
owner of V-1 Oil Station with adequate notice that the state might subject his business
to periodic inspections by officers of the DEQ. Id.
On July 23, 1990, V-1 Oil filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court
of the United States on the issue of Gerber's immunity from the suit. V-I Oil Co. v.
Gerber, 111 S. Ct. 195 (1990) (denying certiorari). In August, 1990, Gerber filed a
cross-petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States on the
issues of the constitutionality of warrantless searches under the Wyoming Environmen-
tal Quality Act, V-l's reasonable expectation of privacy, and Gerber's qualified immu-
nity. Gerber v. V-1 Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 295 (1990) (denying certiorari).
22. See supra note 1 for language of the fourth amendment.
23. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
24. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-86 (1979) (holding that police are
prohibited from making a warrantless entry into a suspect's home for a routine felony
arrest, in part because "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed" (citing United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1971)); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S.
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ance2 fourth amendment rights against the public interest embodied in
administrative inspection schemes.2 6 This inquiry has led the Court to
its current recognition of an exception to the warrant requirement for
certain closely regulated businesses.27
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of warrant-
less administrative searches in Frank v. Maryland.28 In Frank, the
Court held that an investigating officer for the Baltimore City Health
Department did not violate a homeowner's fourth amendment rights
when the officer made a warrantless inspection of the homeowner's res-
idence. 29 The Court announced that administrative inspections of resi-
dences could be constitutional even though no warrant had been
obtained."0 Because of the long history of general consent to such
338, 353 (1976) (stating that the Court's past holdings stand clearly for the proposition
that business premises are protected by the fourth amendment).
The fourth amendment protects persons situated in other enclosures as well. See
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (warrantless wiretap placed by the
FBI on a public telephone booth used by the plaintiff is unconstitutional).
25. The Court recognizes a limited number of situations in which it will balance the
searched person's privacy interest against the public interest. See Michigan Dep't of
State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990) (brief detention of motorists at sobriety
checkpoints); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (drug
testing of railroad employees under federal regulations); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S.
640 (1983) (inventory search of possessions on arrestee's person subsequent to custodial
arrest); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (citizenship checks at
fixed checkpoints); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ("stop and frisk" of suspected
criminals).
The balancing test cases stand in contradistinction to the traditional, generalized rule
which presumes that only searches or seizures for which the police had a warrant or
probable cause are reasonable. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (outlining the
"totality of circumstances" test for probable cause to uphold search warrant involving
home and car).
26. Many administrative regulations drafted to protect the public from health and
safety risks necessitate unannounced, warrantless inspections of businesses. See supra
note 4 for examples of such regulations; see also W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
629-68 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing inspections of business); Remer, The "Junking" of the
Fourth Amendment. The Closely Regulated Industry Exception to the Warrant Require-
ment, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 791, 792 (1988) (discussing the constitutionality of admin-
istrative inspections designed to enforce regulatory statutes).
27. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 712 (1987). See infra notes 59-64 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of Burger.
28. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). Frank involved a Baltimore City Code provision subject-
ing homeowners to a fine if they refused to allow city health officials to inspect their
homes for nuisances based upon cause. Id. at 361. In this case the health official acted
on a neighbor's complaint that rats infested plaintiff's home. Id.
29. Id. at 373.
30. Id.
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searches, the court found that the circumstances surrounding the
search would have to be extreme to violate the fourth amendment.31
The Court then determined that the importance of health inspections
outweighed an individuals' right of privacy.32
The Frank rule required no warrant to prove that an administrative
search was reasonable, and thus constitutional. In 1967, the Court ab-
ruptly changed direction in two separate cases. Camara v. Municipal
Court 33 held that an administrative agency needed a warrant to con-
duct a search of a private residence without the owner's consent.34 The
Court overturned Frank, ruling that fourth amendment protections are
not merely "peripheral" but are as necessary in health and safety in-
spections as they are in criminal investigations.35
In the companion case to Camara, See v. City of Seattle,36 the
Supreme Court extended the warrant requirement to include adminis-
trative searches of commercial premises. The Court held that a war-
rantless inspection of a warehouse pursuant to a city ordinance violated
the business owner's fourth amendment rights.37 The Court ruled that
constitutional challenges to searches shall be determined on a case-by-
case basis using the reasonable expectation of privacy standard implicit
31. Id. at 370.
32. Id. at 372. The Frank Court expressed concern that allowing, in the alterna-
tive, one warrant to suffice for multiple residences would pose a great potential for
abuse. Id. at 363.
33. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
34. 387 U.S. at 540. The case involved a warrantless inspection of an apartment
building by the San Francisco Department of Health pursuant to the City Housing
Code. Id. at 526. Although the landlord permitted the inspectors to enter the lobby of
the building, the landlord refused them access to the actual apartments. Id. at 540.
35. Id. at 530. The Court noted that in non-urgent situations, law enforcement
officials must obtain a warrant where entry is refused. Id. at 539-40. In the administra-
tive search context, the Court held that "[i]f a valid public interest justifies the intrusion
contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search war-
rant." Id. at 539. Although the Court continued to require a search warrant, it did so
under a lower standard of reasonableness of the governmental interest. This standard
requires a lesser showing than the probable cause necessary to obtain a search warrant
in a criminal investigation. Probable cause is defined as "where facts and circumstances
within officers' knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information
are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that
an offense has been or is being committed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (6th ed.
1990).
36. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
37. 387 U.S. at 546. Fire department inspectors conducted the search under a rou-
tine, city-wide probe to enforce fire code standards for commercial businesses. Id. at
541.
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in the fourth amendment.38 Under this test, the Court determined that
the plaintiff at bar could not be subject to such unannounced inspec-
tions.3 ' A warrant thereby became a constitutional precondition to an
administrative search of commercial premises."
The Camara-See proposition shortly gave way to a limited exception
to the warrant requirement for administrative searches of certain regu-
lated businesses. The exception was first recognized in 1970 in Colon-
nade Catering Corp. v. United States.41 In Colonnade, a federal
inspector made a warrantless search of the business premises of a feder-
ally licensed liquor dealer.42 The Court held this inspection did not
violate the fourth amendment.43 Emphasizing that the liquor industry
had been regulated since the founding of the republic, during which
time Congress established procedures to govern inspections, 44 Justice
Douglas concluded that closely regulated industries with a history of
inspections are exempt from the warrant requirement laid out in See.45
In 1972, the Court further widened the exception in United States v.
Biswell.46 The Biswell Court determined that a pawn shop owner's
fourth amendment rights were not violated when federal agents made a
warrantless search of his locked storeroom pursuant to the Gun Con-
38. Id. at 546.
39. Id. at 543. The Court found that ordinary businesspersons have the right to
operate free from unreasonable searches. Id.
40. Later that year, the Court reasserted the proposition that the fourth amendment
protects against warrantless administrative searches in the home or "[w]herever a man
may be." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967). In his concurring opinion,
Justice Harlan explained the reasonable expectation of privacy under the fourth amend-
ment, stating, "there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
41. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
42. Id. at 73. The liquor dealer ran a catering business but also held a federal tax
stamp for retail sales of liquor. Id. at 72. Federal agents visited the dealer's premises
during a party at which liquor was served. Id. at 73. When the agents sought to inspect
the locked storeroom, the president of the catering business resisted the inspection be-
cause the agents could not produce a warrant. Id. One agent broke the lock and in-
spected the storeroom over the president's protestations. Id.
43. Id. at 76-77.
44. The Court distinguished See v. City of Seattle on the ground that the federal
officer in Colonnade was not "using force without definite authority to break down
doors." Id. at 77.
45. id.
46. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
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trol Act.47 Although the firearms industry did not have a long history
of government regulation, the Court nevertheless found the search rea-
sonable due to the importance of the federal interest involved.4 8 The
Court also noted that the inspection was "limited in time, place, and
scope,"'49 a point that became significant in later cases.
Two subsequent cases illustrate the special emphasis the Supreme
Court came to place on the comprehensiveness of regulatory statutes.
In Marshall v. Barlow's Inc. ,1 the Court held that a warrantless in-
spection of an electrical and plumbing installation business subject to
regulation under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)51
violated the fourth amendment.52 The Court reasoned that because
OSHA regulated virtually all businesses involved in interstate com-
47. Id. at 312. The Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(B)-(C) (1988), allows
representatives of the Secretary of Treasury to enter the premises of gun dealers at rea-
sonable times to examine their records and firearms. In Biswell, the pawn shop operator
was also a federally licensed gun dealer. 406 U.S. at 312. A federal treasury agent
entered his shop and requested the dealer permit him to view records and the contents
of a locked storeroom. Although the agent did not have a warrant, he did provide the
dealer with a copy of the section of the Gun Control Act authorizing such searches. Id.
48. 406 U.S. at 315, 317. The Court appeared to reject this rationale a year later in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1973). In Almeida-Sanches,
the Court held unconstitutional a warrantless "roving patrol" search by the Border
Patrol of a Mexican citizen's automobile. Id. at 273. The Court explained that the
valid government interest in controlling the entry of illegal aliens did not justify the
invasion of fourth amendment guarantees, but added that its decision did not overrule
Colonnade or Biswell. Id. at 270-71. The Court stated, "[a] central difference between
those cases and this one is that businessmen engaged in such federally licensed and
regulated enterprises accept the burdens as well as the benefits of their trade, whereas
the petitioner here was not engaged in any regulated or licensed business." Id. at 271.
49. 406 U.S. at 315. The Court also mentioned that requiring a warrant prior to
inspections under the Gun Control Act may frustrate the officers' efforts by giving the
businesspersons time to hide any contraband. Id. at 316.
50. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
51. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
52. 436 U.S. at 325. The Court rejected the Secretary of Labor's argument that the
electrical and plumbing installation business was pervasively regulated. Id. at 313-14.
The Secretary reasoned that since the Walsh-Healy Act of 1936, 41 U.S.C. § 35-45, all
businesses involved in interstate commerce have been subjected to close health and
safety supervision. 436 U.S. at 314. In making its determination, the Court declared
that the warrant exception only applies to businesses with "a long tradition of close
government supervision, of which any person who chooses to enter such a business must
already be aware." Id. at 313. Accordingly, the Court found that the OSHA regula-
tions, which reflect the generality of prior regulations addressed to businesses involved
in interstate commerce, did not adequately prepare those businesses for specific and
pervasive regulations. Id. at 314.
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merce, the theory of implied consent was inappropriate.5 3
In Donovan v. Dewey, 4 however, the Court declared that the Fed-
eral Mine Safety and Health Act55 was sufficiently specific in its guide-
lines to authorize warrantless inspections of mines. 6 The Court's new
emphasis appeared to focus on the adequacy of the notice given to busi-
nesses through the language in the statute.57
The Barlow's and Donovan clarifications left some observers per-
plexed as to the constitutionality of warrantless administrative
searches.5 8 In New York v. Burger,9 the Supreme Court attempted to
lend order to the situation by propounding a more detailed test than
that outlined in Donovan.' ° First, the state must have a substantial
53. Id. at 313-15. The Court referred to language in Almeida stating that "[t]he
businessman in a regulated industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon
him." Id. at 313 (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973)).
The Court stated that imposing a warrant requirement for OSHA inspections burdened
neither the inspectors nor the courts. Id. at 316. Further, the Court noted that most
health and safety infractions are difficult to conceal even if the business owner received
advance notice, and that the issuance of warrants takes up little of the court's time. Id.
at 316-20. In the alternative, the Court suggested the possibility of using ex parte war-
rants. Id. at 320 n.15.
54. 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
55. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1988). See supra note 5 for a discussion of FMSHA.
56. 452 U.S. at 606. The Court stated "it is the pervasiveness and regularity of the
federal regulation that ultimately determines whether a warrant is necessary to render
an inspection program reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id. The statute in
question provided for at least four inspections per year of all federal underground
mines, two inspections per year for surface mines, and added that no advance notice
would be given. Id. at 596.
57. Id. at 600. The Donovan Court applied a two-step inquiry to determine the
constitutionality of warrantless administrative inspections. The Court asked (1)
whether "Congress has reasonably determined that warrantless searches are necessary
to further a regulatory scheme" and (2) whether "the federal regulatory presence is
sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot
help but be aware that the property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken
for specific purposes." Id.
58. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEizuRE 661-69 (2d ed. 1987); Note, Adminis-
trative Searches- The Ninth Circuit Extends the Closely Regulated Industry Exception to
the Fourth Amendment, 1985 ARiz. ST. L.J. 973 (1985) (illustrating differences between
the two decisions); Note, Constitutional Law- Warrantless Administrative Searches and
the Two-Step Test of Donovan v. Dewey, 56 TUL. L. REv. 1467 (1982) (examining
differences in analysis between the Donovan and Barlow's decisions).
59. 482 U.S. 691 (1987). In Burger, the Court upheld a warrantless administrative
inspection of an automobile junkyard. The investigators acted under a New York stat-
ute authorizing such inspections in order to curtail motor vehicle theft. Id. at 694 n. 1.
60. See supra note 57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Donovan test.
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interest in regulating the industry.6 1 Second, regulation of the industry
must serve the state's interests and warrantless administrative inspec-
tions must be necessary to further the regulation's purpose.62 Third,
the statute must provide a reasonably adequate substitute for a war-
rant.63 Critics of the three-part test charge that the Burger Court sac-
rificed fourth amendment values in favor of doctrinal clarity.6
V-1 Oil Co. v. Wyoming, Department of Environmental Quality65
presented the Tenth Circuit with an opportunity to determine the lim-
its of the warrantless administrative search in an environmental law
context.66 In V-I Oil the court confined the administrative search ex-
ception to "narrow statutes which regulate particular industries" and
provide "'assurance of regularity' of inspections. 67 The court began
by holding that the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act authorized
warrantless inspections of storage tanks.68 Although the statute does
not mention the words "warrantless search," the court determined that
a general authorization for inspections sanctions warrantless inspec-
tions. 69 The court also found that inspection of storage tanks was nec-
essary to detect violations of the statute.7'
61. 482 U.S. at 702. In effect, the industry must pose a significant threat to society
and the state must have an interest in regulating the industry to minimize such harm.
Id. at 708.
62. Id. The regulation must reduce or prevent the social problem which justified
the regulation. Id. at 710. Additionally, the element of surprise must be necessary to
the scheme for remedying the social problem. Id.
63. 482 U.S. at 702-03. The statute can satisfy the third element of the test if it puts
regulated businesses on notice that authorized officials will subject the premises to war-
rantless inspections, and will limit inspections in time, place and scope. Id. at 711-12.
64. In the wake of Burger, some commentators question whether the decision repre-
sented a complete erosion of the fourth amendment safeguards from administrative in-
spections. See Remer, supra note 26 at 792 (Burger arguably stretches the regulated
industry exception beyond its intended limits); Note, The Widening Exception to the
Warrant Requirement In the Area of Administrative Searches, 29 B.C.L. Rav. 1009
(1988)(Burger signifies an erosion of the fourth amendment).
65. 902 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1990). See supra notes 7-21 and accompanying text
for a description of the facts.
66. 902 F.2d at 1485-87. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the standards a warrantless administrative search must meet in order to pass
constitutional muster.
67. 902 F.2d at 1487.
68. Id. at 1485. The court reached this conclusion as a matter of statutory con-
struction. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. The court interpreted the Act liberally, in accord with the overriding public
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Applying the three-part Burger test,71 the court concluded that a
warrantless search pursuant to the Act must be unconstitutional.72
The court noted the exception to the warrant requirement for closely
regulated businesses,73 and determined that the gasoline industry quali-
fied as a pervasively regulated industry.74 The case therefore satisfied
the first step of the Burger test.75
The court then examined whether the statute provided a constitu-
tionally adequate substitute for a warrant.7 6 The court found that the
Wyoming Environmental Quality Act was not so specific that commer-
cial property owners would know their property was subject to unan-
nounced administrative inspections of specific scope.77 Although
purporting to follow Burger, the court in effect narrowed the adminis-
trative search exception by requiring that regulatory statutes be tai-
lored to specific industries.78
interest embodied in the Act. Id. The state enacted the statute to prevent and detect
violations. Id.
71. Id. at 1485-86 (citing New York v. Burger 482 U.S. 691 (1987)). See supra
notes 59-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Burger test.
72. 902 F.2d at 1487.
73. Id. at 1485 (citing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)).
74. Ie at 1486. The court pointed to Wyo. STAT. §§ 39-6-203(b), 213(a), 205, 209
(1988), Wyo. STAT. §§ 39-6-204, 206, 208 (1989), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-6991i (1988),
among the many statutes regulating the gasoline industry. 902 F.2d at 1468.
75. 902 F.2d at 1486-87. The court artfully avoided what might have been the most
difficult prong of the Burger test, namely whether warrantless inspections are necessary
to the regulatory scheme. Id. at 1486 n.1. The record provided insufficient facts from
which to make this determination, but the court had no need to reach the issue because
of its findings regarding the third prong. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (citing Burger v. New York, 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987)). The court noted
that, as written, the Wyoming Act applies to virtually all businesses within the state and
therefore fails to notify any particular industry that warrantless searches may take
place. Id. at 1487. The court remarked that the Act also failed to adequately limit the
time, place, and scope of such searches. Id. (citing Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594
(1981)).
78. Id. See supra note 39 for a discussion of reasonable expectations of privacy.
Although both the Wyoming Statute in V-1 Oil and the OSHA regulations in Barlow's
control environmental matters, one pertinent difference between them could produce
opposite results under the Burger test. In Barlow's the Court refused to recognize the
electrical and plumbing installation business as a closely regulated business simply be-
cause it was involved in interstate commerce. See supra note 50. Yet the Wyoming
statute in V-1 Oil governs only businesses which have a source of air, water, or land
pollution. See supra note 14. Such businesses have been pervasively regulated in the
past. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1970); Federal Water Pollution Con-
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The court's decision in V-I Oil demands reconsideration for an im-
portant practical reason. The narrower warrant exception for adminis-
trative searches to "very closely regulated industries with stringent
authorizing statutes"7 9 will induce legislatures to redraft many of their
statutes to conform with judicial readings of the fourth amendment's
particularity requirement. Although the court's analysis reflects in-
creased concern for fourth amendment safeguards regarding adminis-
trative searches,80 the holding in V-1 Oil will invalidate many
administrative inspection schemes as presently codified. For example,
warrantless inspections under environmental protection statutes as
broad as the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act may be deemed un-
constitutional for not providing adequate notice of inspection to own-
ers of particular commercial businesses."1 As new industries emerge,
legislatures cannot know in advance the dangers they may pose to soci-
ety. Administrative inspections may be necessary to protect the public
from such unknown dangers. Therefore, some generalization may be
necessary in crafting regulatory programs.
Because courts determine the constitutionality of warrantless admin-
trol Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1972); Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2671 (1976). More specifically, Wyoming regulates the gasoline industry for
purposes of pollution prevention, licensing, and record keeping. See WYO. STAT. § 35-
9-141 (1977).
79. Remer, supra note 26, at 810. Remer offered four alternative analyses the Court
could select from to redefine the post-Burger fourth amendment standard. Id. at 809-
10. The Tenth Circuit apparently followed Remer's suggestion to narrow the exception
to the warrant requirement for administrative searches to include only "very closely
regulated industries with stringent authorizing statutes." Id. at 810.
80. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text for the constitutionality of a war-
rantless administrative search.
81. See, eg., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) § 9, 7
U.S.C. 136g(a) (1988); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 2610
(1988). Clean Water Act of 1977 § 308, 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(B) (1988) (allowing ad-
ministrators to search facilities where effluent sources are located, to inspect the facil-
ity's equipment, and to sample effluents); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA) 42 U.S.C. § 6927(a) (1988) (allowing administrators to enter facilities
where effluent sources are located, inspect the facility's monitoring equipment, and to
take samples); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(e) (1988) (allowing representatives, when they be-
lieve a threat is posed, to enter at any reasonable time a facility where hazardous sub-
stances may be generated, stored, treated, or disposed so they may determine an
appropriate response); Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1974 § 109(c), 49
U.S.C. § 1808(c) (1982 & Supp. 111984); Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979
§ 21 1(c), 49 U.S.C. § 2010(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Unwarranted searches pursuant
to these statutes are necessary to advance the important national interest of protecting
the environment.
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istrative searches on a case-by-case basis, 2 it is unclear whether the
Tenth Circuit's analysis in V-1 Oil would invalidate most environmen-
tal regulatory programs. Each statute in and of itself must satisfy the
criteria set forth in Burger. 3 Nonetheless, it has been suggested that
the standards for constitutionality should be less strict where the war-
rantless investigations do not seek evidence of criminal conduct, but
only violations of administrative regulations.84
The Supreme Court in Burger indicated that time, place, and scope
limitations were crucial to determining the constitutionality of a war-
rantless inspection scheme.8 5 In V-1 Oil, the Tenth Circuit attempted
to define the extent to which these characteristics must be limited. Un-
less courts acknowledge the realities of the legislative and administra-
tive processes in articulating fourth amendment standards, many
public health and safety statutes and regulations could be rendered
unenforceable.
Jennifer D. Sheehan *
82. See Canara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-38 (1967); see also supra
notes 33-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of Camara.
83. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Burger test.
84. W. LAFAVE, supra note 26, at 180 (2d ed. 1987).
85. W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SElzuRE 41 (Supp. 1989).
* J.D. 1992, Washington University.
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